#### ROSIS - An Overview

# Radiation Oncology Safety Information System

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#### ROSIS

# International Web-based system developed to improve safety in radiotherapy

www.rosis.info



## ROSIS - background

- Incidents can have serious consequences in radiotherapy
- Information about incidents is generally not shared between radiotherapy departments
- Lost opportunities to learn from incidents and prevent injury to future patients
- To be proactive rather than reactive




- To improve safety
  - By enabling Radiotherapy departments to share and view reports on incidents
  - By collecting and analysing information on the occurrence, detection, severity and correction of Radiotherapy incidents
  - By disseminating the results and promoting awareness of incidents and a safety culture in Radiotherapy



- To establish an Internet-based system to enable
  - Reporting incidents and near incidents
  - Sharing this information through web-access to a central database
  - Analysis of the incidents and near incidents





- To establish an Internet-based system to enable
  - radiotherapy clinics to address safety issues before an accidental exposure occurs
  - A general culture of safety awareness by making information available on details of incidents, nearincidents and corrective actions, submitted on-line by other radiotherapy clinics.






- To investigate ways in which
- a hazard classification system can be defined
  - frequency analysis can be performed
    - together leading to the identification of safety-critical steps in the radiotherapy treatment process where errors are likely to occur or to be detected
    - To identify trends



#### **ROSIS - Timelines**









Collaboration

#### **ROSIS - Timelines**





- 150+ Departments registered worldwide
- Europe
  - 91departments representing
     16 countries
- Africa, Asia,
   Australia, North
   America/Canada,
   South/Central
   America
- Up to 24
   departments per
   region





#### Number of patients per member of staff

Discipline	Average number of patients	ESTRO HERO data (median)
Oncologists	281	196 (72-451)
Physicists	387	302 (139-544)
RTTs at treatment unit	159	63 (27–233)
RTTs at Simulation	546	
Dosimetrists	549	
Technical/ Maintenance	833	



QA Activity	<b>Total %</b>
Chart check	90
In vivo dosimetry	34
Peer review	56
Portal images	94
Regular clinical review	73
Quality control procedures	91
Procedures for clinical processes	63
Formal Quality Management System	35
Regular QA of treatment units	98
Audit programme	69
Other QA	28



#### External Audit

 The majority of departments (68%) participate in an audit programme

Audit system	Number of participating departments
IAEA	10
Equal/ESTRO	18
Radiological Physics Centre (RPC) at MD Anderson	7
Other regional/national	23
Not specified	24



## **ROSIS** Reports

- 1074 reports analysed
  - External Beam RT 97.7% (1049)
  - Brachytherapy 1.9% (20)

0

Other modalities - 0.5% (5) (mainly non-process)



### ROSIS reports

- In 576 (51%) reports some treatment was delivered incorrectly
- 86% of incidents affected 1-3 fractions
- In approx. 15% of cases almost full prescription delivered incorrectly



## ROSIS reports: detection

#### When

- Treatment stage 73%
- Pre-treatment 25%
- Follow-up 2%

#### Who


 The majority (56%) of the reported incidents were detected by Therapists at the treatment unit



#### ROSIS Data: Who discovered

#### o1074 reports anlaysed

- •Brachytherapy ∘1.9% (20)
- Other modalities
   o0.5% (5) (mainly non-process).






## ROSIS reports: detection

- How
  - 43% Detected at the time of patient treatment
  - 33% Detection by chart check
    - Approximately 50% (168) of the chart checks reports were detected pre-treatment, the other half (167) were found during treatment or at follow-up
- Shows the importance of continuous vigilance




#### **ROSIS Data: How discovered**






## ROSIS Data: Origin of incidents






## ncident Origin



Most incidents/near incidents originated pre-treatment



## **Incident Discovery**



Most incidents/near incidents were discovered at treatment

#### ROSIS Data: QA / QC role

- 1200 registered incidents analysed
  - 331 detected through chart check
  - 22 detected through clinical review
  - 18 detected through equipment QA





# ROSIS – Record and Verify incidents

- Record and Verify causing/contributing: 147/600 (24.5%)
  - Data input, software/network problems, violations, failure to update with changes





# ROSIS – Record and Verify incidents

- Data Input into Record and Verify: 115/600 (19.2%)
  - 30% of Treatment Volume Reports (56/185)
  - 16% of Accessory Reports (19/119)
  - 15% of Dose Reports (29/192)
- 83% occurred at the pre-treatment stage
- 62% discovered at time of treatment
- 53 (46%) Resulted in incorrect treatment



#### **ROSIS Data: Data Transfer**

- Wide variation in data transfer capapbilities and networking in the departments
  - 62% of reports where incident had a data transfer component were discovered at treatment
  - 46% resulted in incorrect treatment delivery





- 16 cases reported to ROSIS
  - Consistent with the literature
  - "The potential for misidentification errors is greatest in acute care hospitals
    - Wide range of patient interventions
    - Carried out in various locations
    - Staff working shift
      - Policy Directive, Department of Health, NSW





- 4 incidents/near incidents could have been prevented if protocols or guidelines had been in place
  - Student brought incorrect patient into the treatment room – discovered when staff addressed the patients
  - Incorrect patient brought into the treatment room – reference marks did not fit



- 4 incidents/near incidents could have been prevented if protocols or guidelines had been in place
  - Label in header on the treatment chart different to patient barcode
    - Barcode correct incorrect inclusion of patient labels at different points in the patient pathway



- 4 incidents/near incidents could have been prevented if protocols or guidelines had been in place
  - New patient admitted same name as previous patient in that bed, treatment booked
    - Detected when administration clerk checked date of birth





- The negative side of protocols (7 incidents)
- Two patients with the same pathology to start treatment
  - Second patient informed staff that his name was not correct
  - Data checked and found to be incorrect
  - First patient slightly deaf treated in error
  - Set up references were ignored





## **ROSIS** reports: Biases

- Voluntary reporting not true crosssection
- Reporting bias e.g.
  - Not all types of incidents might be reported
  - Not true frequency of each incident
  - Not absolute relative frequency of incidents
- BUT DO get useful information on
- Types, causes and discovery of errors reported

