

# Transnational Nuclear Arms Control during the Cold War

Matthew Evangelista, Cornell University



Presentation prepared for the conference,  
The Increasing Danger of Nuclear Weapons: And How Physicists Can Help Reduce the Threat  
23 - 25 October 2023,  
ICTP - The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste

# OUTLINE

Main Transnational Organizations

Transnational Strategies

- Joint Policy Proposals
- Target Other Side's Public Opinion/Legislature
- Direct Action

Successes, partial successes, and failures of the transnational movements

Comparing the Cold War to Today

- Factors influencing cooperation
- The role of China and Russia
- Lessons/Questions

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- Pugwash
- Isodarco
- Soviet-American Disarmament Study (SADS) group
- Dartmouth Conferences
- International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)
- European Nuclear Disarmament (END) Movement
- Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement
- Greenpeace
- Women's peace camps
- East bloc independent groups

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## Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

# ISODARCO

*International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts*  
*Founded in 1966 - Italian Pugwash Group*



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## Home

**ISODARCO** is an NGO founded in 1966 by two Italian physics professors, Edoardo Amaldi and Carlo Schaefer, that offers a unique international forum on security problems throughout the world. ISODARCO's purpose is to bring together those with a great variety of experiences and approaches relating to security problems. Their discussions focus on commissioned expert papers.

## ISODARCO Golden Jubilee 1966-2016

**A message from USA President Barack Obama**  
**A medal from Italian President Sergio Mattarella**





## Soviet-American Disarmament Study Group, bilateral offshoot of Pugwash

HOLLIS for *Archival Discovery*

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
[99 CITATION](#)

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### SADS [Soviet-American Disarmament Studies],, 1962-1976

FOUND IN: [Harvard University Archives](#) / [Paul M. Doty personal archive](#), / [Resource files,, 1940-2011](#) / [Institutions,, 1945-2011](#) / SADS [Soviet-American






## The Dartmouth Conferences

James Voorhees, *Dialogue Sustained: The Multilevel Peace Process and the Dartmouth Conference* (United States Institute of Peace, 2002)



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International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War



## Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement



# Natural Resources Defense Council/Soviet Academy of Sciences Seismic Verification Project



*Natural Resources  
Defense Council*

1350 New York Ave., N  
Washington, DC 2000  
202 783-7800

## NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL NUCLEAR TEST BAN VERIFICATION PROJECT

STATUS REPORT  
NOVEMBER 1986


On May 28, 1986, the Natural Resources Defense Council entered into an historic agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences to establish three seismic monitoring stations around the principal nuclear weapons test site in each nation. The purpose of the project is to demonstrate that verification is not an obstacle to a nuclear test moratorium or ban. The project will also collect seismic data to improve estimates of yields of nuclear weapons tests, under the current treaty limit of 150 kilotons or a possible lowered threshold. In just five months, NRDC has made remarkable progress in the implementation of one of the largest and most important private scientific exchanges ever undertaken with the Soviet Union.

### SEMIPALATINSK SEISMIC STATIONS


Since late summer, NRDC scientists have been operating surface seismometers at three locations around the major Soviet nuclear weapons test near Semipalatinsk, about 1800 miles southeast of Moscow in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Soviets have virtually completed construction of the three permanent stations at Karkaralinsk, Bayanaul, and Karasu. These stations are to be equipped with state-of-the-art high frequency



# European Nuclear Disarmament



E. P. Thompson @ Glastonbury Festival 1986



Mary Kaldor





# Greenham Common



The Women's Peace Camp 1981 - 2000



## **Protesters at the Greenham Common Peace Camp, 1984**

Women protesting the stationing of nuclear weapons at the site maintained a presence at the site for 19 years from 5 September 1981.

<http://www.iwm.org.uk/upload/package/22/greenham/index.htm>

Welcome to  
**HISTORICAL**  
**SENECA FALLS**  
*Home of*  
**WOMEN'S RIGHTS**  
 INCORPORATED 1831  
 NAVIGATION LOCK-LIFT 49 FT.

Seneca (NY) Army Depot  
 Women's Peace Encampment,  
 early 1980s



**WOMEN'S ENCAMPMENT FOR A FUTURE OF PEACE & JUSTICE**  
 SUMMER 1983 • SENECA ARMY DEPOT • NY

1980 WOMEN OF THE NORTH AMERICAN CONFEDERACY MEET AT SENECA TO DEMAND AN END TO WAR AND THE NATIONS

1800s: ABOLITIONISTS MAKE SENECA COUNTY A MAJOR STOP ON THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD WITH HARRIET TUBMANS HOUSE NEAR THE PRESENT DAY ARMY DEPOT

1848: EARLY FEMINISTS HOLD FIRST WOMEN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION AT SENECA FALLS TO CALL FOR SUFFRAGE & EQUAL PARTICIPATION IN ALL OTHER AREAS OF LIFE

URBAN & RURAL WOMEN JOIN TOGETHER IN SENECA COUNTY TO CHALLENGE THE NUCLEAR THREAT TO LIFE ITSELF. WE FOCUS ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE SENECA ARMY DEPOT TO PREVENT DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENT

**SOURCE HANDBOOK**



More photos and history: [http://peacecampherstory.blogspot.com/2007/06/thanks-to-nancy-and-judi-of-womens\\_11.html](http://peacecampherstory.blogspot.com/2007/06/thanks-to-nancy-and-judi-of-womens_11.html)

# *Wolność i Pokój (WiP)* Freedom and Peace





**Mitglieder der Gruppe Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte** [members of the Group Initiative for Peace and Human Rights] Ost-Berlin, um 1986  
Photographie Ulrike Poppe, Berlin  
© Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

END SPECIAL REPORT:

# MOSCOW INDEPENDENT PEACE GROUP


Jean Stead \* Danielle Grünberg \* Documents



# RETURN ADDRESS: MOSCOW

INTERNATIONAL NEWS BULLETIN ON INDEPENDENT  
PEACE ACTIVITY IN USSR.

ISSUE: VOL. 1  
NUMBER 1984.  
THE GROUP FOR  
ESTABLISHING TRUST: 1



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Frank von Hippel

Andrei Sakharov



Randall Forsberg Gennadii Gerasimov



Thomas Cochran

Evgenii Velikhov



Evgenii Chazov

Bernard Lown



# A Soviet assessment of the accomplishments of Pugwash (1972)

“In fifteen years the participants of this movement have examined many important proposals having substantial significance for the resolution of problems of disarmament and the achievement of a reduction in international tensions. Several of these proposals later became subjects of examination at the government level and were used in working out international agreements and treaties.”

“Proekt (dokladnyi zapiski) v Prezidium Akademii nauk SSSR ob itogakh 15-ti letnei deiatelnosti Paguoshskogo dvizheniia uchenykh,” September 24, 1972, M. Millionshchikov papers, fond 1713, opis' 2, delo I.5.2, no. 209, Archive of the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation.



Among the agreements that, in Millionshchikov's view, resulted from Pugwash proposals, he lists:

- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
- Limited Test-Ban Treaty
- Seabed Treaty
- Biological Weapons Convention
- Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
- SALT I Treaty

“The importance of the Pugwash meetings consists precisely in the fact that a dialogue takes place there between people who know the problems well and who can unofficially inform those government bodies which deal with these problems through state-to-state channels.”

TRANSLATION

Academy of Sciences  
Moscow

dated Oct. 14, 1967  
received Oct. 23, 1967

No. 621

Prof. P. Doty  
Department of Chemistry  
12 Oxford Street  
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts  
U.S.A.

Dear Professor Doty:

I am very sorry, we didn't meet each other on Pugwash Conference in Ronneby. Discussions were very lively there, and I hope, very useful for all Pugwash association.

As I am informed, you and your colleagues are going to come to Moscow at December 28 - 30, after Pugwash. It would be pleasure for us to have you and the other American scientists about whom you have written as the guests of the Soviet Pugwas Committee. As I see from our correspondence you will come with Long, Wiesner, Ruina, Kissinger, Brown, Parsons, Kistiakowsky, and Rathjens.

(signed) A. M. Millionshchikov

**NOTE: On November 14 Mr. Vladimir Pavlichenko (PL 4-1234, ext. 2553 - area code 212) authorized the addition of Carl Kaysen to the group.**

ВНВ

АКАДЕМИЯ НАУК  
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Москва, В-71, Ленинский проспект, 14  
Коммутатор: В 2-00-20  
Канцелярия: В 2-49-83

14 1 1967  
№ 621

Prof. P. Doty  
Department of Chemistry  
12 Oxford Street  
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts  
U.S.A.

Уважаемый профессор Доти,

Очень жаль, что нам не удалось встретиться на Пагуошской конференции в Роннебю. Дискуссии на конференции были очень оживленными и, я надеюсь, полезными для целей Пагуошского движения.

Как мне стало известно, в период с 28 по 30 декабря Вы и Ваши коллеги по Пагуошу сможете приехать в Москву. Мы будем рады принять Вас и других американских ученых, о которых Вы писали, как гостей Советского Пагуошского комитета. Как я понял из нашей переписки, вместе с Вами предполагают приехать Лонг, Визнер, Руина, Киссингер, Браун, Т. Парсонс, Кистьяковский и Райджерс.

С уважением,

*Миллионщиков*  
И. Д. Миллионщиков  
академик

При ответе сослаться на Ваш А. М. и дату  
Адрес: один из телефонов в Президиуме АН СССР, Москва В-71, Нурма

2

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Адрес для телеграмм и Прессинформ: МН СССР, Москва В-71, Наука

2

# Harvard-MIT Arms Control Seminar, circa 1960



To John F. McHargston  
from your counsel and clear vision  
made the treaty possible  
with my warm regards & admiration  
A. Donald Harrison

Participants included Thomas Schelling, Henry Kissinger, Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Abram Chayes, Morton Halperin, Jerome Weisner, Milton Katz, Paul Doty.



*Frank Taylor*



Paul Doty



George Kistiakowsky



Jerome Wiesner

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# TARGETING THE OTHER SIDE'S PUBLIC OPINION/LEGISLATURE: SDI

You people are saying that if we go ahead with Star Wars, there can be no disarmament. I agree, but you should turn it around. You should see that if both sides go ahead with disarmament, there can be no Star Wars.

Disarmament in and of itself might be the answer to Star Wars. **With offensive reductions underway, there would be no political support for Star Wars** [in the United States]. On the other hand, if there are no offensive reductions in prospect, there will be all the more support for Star Wars. You need political restraints, not further legal assurances concerning the ABM treaty.

Jeremy Stone, FAS  
Moscow, April 1985



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# Direct Action: Greenpeace



1971 Amchitka,  
Alaska

1982 Leningrad,  
USSR

1985 Aukland,  
New Zealand



Daniel Ellsberg

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# **Some successes and partial successes of the transnational movement**

- Restraints on nuclear testing
- Limits on ballistic-missile defenses
- Withdrawal of short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles
- Defensive restructuring and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Europe
- Acceptance of intrusive on-site inspections

## **Arms Control Treaties**

- 1959 Antarctic Treaty
- 1963 Hot Line Agreement
- 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty
- 1967 Outer Space Treaty
- 1967 Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
- 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
- 1971 Seabed Treaty
- 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (Interim Agreement)
- 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
- 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
- 1974 Vladivostok Agreement
- 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
- 1977 Environmental Modification Convention
- 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II
- 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
- 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty - INF
- 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement
- 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
- 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II
- 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba
- 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
- 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
- 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

## Arms Control Treaties

1959 Antarctic Treaty

1963 Hot Line Agreement

**1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty**

1967 Outer Space Treaty

1967 Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

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1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

1977 Environmental Modification Convention

1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II

1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

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
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# What other factors influenced Soviet-American transnational security cooperation?

- Strategic context: “parity” (for both)

# How U.S. And Russian Nuclear Arsenals Evolved

Stockpiled nuclear warhead count by year






# What other factors influenced Soviet-American transnational security cooperation?

- Strategic context: “parity” (for both)
- Economic costs of arms race and memory of World War II (genuine fear of nuclear war) favor restraint (mainly USSR)

# Economic Constraints

Eisenhower: “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.”\*\*



Khrushchev: “**Missiles are not cucumbers, one cannot eat them** and one does not require more than a certain number in order to ward off an attack.”\*



\*Eisenhower’s Chance for Peace speech, 16 April 1953.

\*\*Khrushchev remarks in *Pravda*, 29 May 1960.

# What other factors influenced Soviet-American transnational security cooperation?

- Strategic context: “parity” (for both)
- Economic costs of arms race and memory of World War II (genuine fear of nuclear war) favor restraint (mainly USSR)
- Popular activism favors restraint (mainly USA)
- Respect for scientists give them privileged access to leadership (USSR)
- Scientists compete for access with other groups (USA)
- “Linkage” may hinder cooperation (for both)
  - to other aspects of foreign policy

# Foreign-Policy Linkage

US War in Vietnam  
(1964-1973)



Soviet invasions of  
Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979)



# What other factors besides domestic structure and strategies influenced Soviet-American transnational security cooperation?

- Strategic context: “parity” (for both)
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- “Linkage” may hinder cooperation (for both)
  - to other aspects of foreign policy
  - to internal politics, human rights


# Human-Rights Linkage

This was exemplified by our group, *Scientists for Sakharov, Orlov and Shcharansky* (SOS), an international movement to promote and protect the human rights of scientists. It was created by a group of us, mainly physicists at the University of California's Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, during the period of the Orlov and Shcharansky trials in the summer of 1978. After the internal exile of Sakharov in 1980, SOS extended its efforts worldwide.

SOS has a simple, two-part policy:

(1) Individual scientists — operating independently of their governments — should take strong and vigorous action to protect the human rights of their colleagues, with the particular choice of action dependent on the particular case. In the 1980 effort, SOS members pledged themselves to a moratorium on scientific exchange with the Soviet Union. (This moratorium was happily discontinued in 1987 after Sakharov's release from Gorky).

(2) Scientific cooperation between countries must include guarantees of freedom of communication, reciprocity in the exchange process free of political interference, and respect for the fundamental human rights of our colleagues.



Morris Pripstein, "Sakharov, scientists, and human rights; a personal recollection,"  
*Andrei Sakharov: facets of a life* (1991)

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# What lessons of the Soviet-American transnational nuclear engagement might apply to Chinese-American relations?

There are many differences between the Soviet and the Chinese situations:

- The Soviet economy was always smaller than the US one and in relative decline from the 1970s; the Chinese economy is strong and growing relative to the US one.
- Soviet-American transnational relations at a non-governmental level were rare during the Cold War; Chinese-American relations are much more extensive, so contacts between arms-control scientists are not so “special.”



# What lessons of the Soviet-American transnational nuclear engagement might apply to Chinese-American relations?

More questions than answers:

- In the absence of “parity” would economic concerns or fear of nuclear war lead the Chinese government to favor nuclear restraint?
- Do scientists enjoy privileged access to Chinese authorities and could the Chinese leaders implement their recommendations in the face of opposition from other institutions of the security establishment?
- Would “linkage” politics hinder cooperation?
  - Regarding foreign policy (trade or conflict over South China Sea)
  - Regarding human rights (situation in Xinjiang)

# Finally...what about Russia?

- Will Russia ever be ready to return to arms control negotiations with the United States?
- After the invasion of Ukraine, can Russia be trusted to abide by agreements?
- Will involving China make for difficult three-way negotiations?
- Can the transnational scientists' coalition of Russian/US/European supporters of arms control be revived?

Thank you