

Transition from EOPs to SAMGs



**Joint IAEA-ICTP Essential Knowledge Workshop on
Nuclear Power Plant Design Safety – Updated IAEA Safety Standards 9-
20 October 2017**


Presented by
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APoSS d.o.o.

- EOP entrance/exit criteria
- SAMG entry/exit criteria
 - Various examples
- References

- Accidents are, in principle, covered by EOPs
 - e.g.: LOCA, SGTR, ATWS, SBO
- EOPs go way beyond DBA
 - e.g. up to probability of $1.0E-08$ (WOG EOPs)
 - EOPs include non-conventional cooling
 - May include cooling by non-qualified water sources
- But the EOPs may not be able to prevent core damage
 - Operator has done everything he could, there is no way left to cool the core, all is tried but failed
 - THAT is the moment to enter SAMG

- Entry into EOP from AOP is usually through occurrence of scram or safety system actuation
 - Entry is followed by diagnosis according to e.g. E-0 (WOG approach)
- Exit from EOP to SAMG is *imminent* or *actual* core damage

Westinghouse Severe Accident Management



Purpose

- Protect fission product boundaries
- Mitigate releases
- Mitigate severe accident phenomena
- Restore controlled stable condition

Features

- Implemented by TSC
- Separate from EOPs
- Symptom based

Domain of SAMG is big drama:


- Plant is lost
- Life maybe in danger – also life of family
- Plant status confusing – what is going on???
 - ‘half of instrumentation is red, other half is dead’
- Needed actions can be conflicting, and maybe contrary to ‘normal’ actions (i.e. in EOP-domain):
 - EOP-space: spraying the containment is okay,
 - SAMG space: spraying may de-inert containment atmosphere: hydrogen burn??
- Outcome of actions can be uncertain

When is there core damage?

- Inside DBA: ECCS design criteria to be observed (1200 °C, 17% clad oxidation)
- Outside DBA: higher temp. / oxidation can be accepted, but mass of molten corium should still be around 0 kg.
- Investigation of amount of molten mass in TACIS/PHARE project, using MELCOR calculations

Entrance into FR-C.1	Amount of molten mass in vessel	Strategies
550 °C	0 kg	All C.1 strategies effective
650 °C	0 kg	Sec. depressurisation not effective
750 °C	150 kg	None of C.1 strategies effective

PWR transient at threshold of FR.C-1 (example)



- Must have observable criteria
 - No time to do calculations
- There is a wide scatter in such criteria
 - Each vendor / Owners Group has its own criteria
 - Examples: WOG, CEOG, B&WOG, EdF GIAG (~ SAMG in French), Areva (EPR)


Westinghouse Owners Group SAMG:

- Entry conditions SAMG defined by exit of EOPs:
 - FR-C.1: core exit T_{\max} **AND** all recovery failed (i.e., core damage unavoidable)
 - FR-S.1: core exit above T_{\max}
 - ECA 0.0: core exit above T_{\max}
 - $T_{\max} = \text{ca. } 550 - 650 \text{ } ^\circ\text{C}$, is plant specific
 - T_{\max} is 'red entry' into FR-C.1 (but there recovery is available)

EOPs exited; all actions that remain useful are also in SAMG.

Combustion Engineering Owners Group SAMG:

- EOPs are not formally exited! SAMG executed in parallel, but consistency checked, priority always with SAMG
- Entry into SAMGs is decision of Site Emergency Director (SED), not MCR, basis is not just CET (core exit T)
- Basis:
 - flow insufficient to cool the core
 - level indication ~ 0%
 - CET 10 °C superheat and rising



- CET 1100°C or activity inside containment according to table
 - prevents too early transition
- Decision by plant headquarters

Time after Scram	Setpoint
$t < 1 \text{ hr}$	$s = 500 \text{ Gy/hr}$
$1 \text{ hr} < t < 6 \text{ hrs}$	$s = 100 \text{ Gy/hr}$
$6 \text{ hrs} < t < 5 \text{ days}$	$s = 50 \text{ Gy/hr}$
$5 \text{ days} < t < 1 \text{ month}$	$s = 10 \text{ Gy/hr}$
$t > 1 \text{ month}$	$s = 5 \text{ Gy/hr}$


- *COT = 650°C at any pressure*
- *Containment dose rate*

- *COT = 1000°C (less for high P RCS > 65 bar)*
- *Hydrogen concentration*
- *Containment dose rate*

▶ **OL3: EOP**

→ **ECHU** (*Emergency Core Heat-Up*)

→ **OSSA**



▶ **FA3: EOP**


- *COT = 650°C*
- *Containment dose rate*

→ **OSSA**

Not only system parameters are relevant, also ***readiness of organisation*** :

- ERO (TSC) must be operational
- Operational means: TSC understands the situation and is ready to give its **first recommendation**; NOT: TSC has arrived and has assembled in their room!
- Make sure guidance is in place if TSC is not yet operational (needed for e.g. ATWS); in WOG: SACRG-1

Example of ERO, note the Accident Management Team



- SAMG is not a long-term concept
- Dependent on accident evolution decisions on long-term provisions
 - cooling
 - power
 - treatment of run-off water
 - decontamination

Example from Westinghouse:

- Core temp. $< [x]$ AND stable or decreasing
- Site releases $< [y]$ AND stable or decreasing
- Containment pressure $< [z]$ AND stable or decreasing
- Containment hydrogen $< [u]$ AND stable or decreasing

Conclusions

- Various approaches for the transition EOP-SAMG, basis: imminent or actual core damage
- Transition includes not only a change in guidelines, but is a fully different approach – be aware of this!
- Transition should be clearly described, including all organisational changes
- Avoid any time gap in the transition – no pause in the handling of the accident
- Exit to long-term provisions: also needed

- [1] „Transition from EOPs to SAMG,, George Vayssier,
IAEA SAMG workshop, 10-14 December 2012, Islamabad,
Pakistan

END

APoS

Questions?
Comments?

Thanks for your attention!