# Ionospheric Effects on GNSS Augmentation Systems

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Regional Workshop on GNSS and Space Weather



# Introduction

- The Global Positioning System (GPS) requires augmentation in order to meet the strict requirements necessary to support the guidance of aircraft
  - > This is also true for the other core constellations

#### > The main challenges for GNSS are:

- Integrity is it safe to use?
- > Continuity will there be interruptions?
- > Availability can you count on it when you need it?

#### Augmentation systems fill in the gaps that GPS and the other constellations cannot meet by themselves

"**GNSS**. A worldwide position and time determination system that includes one or more satellite constellations, aircraft receivers and system integrity monitoring, augmented as necessary to support the required navigation performance for the intended operation." [ICAO Annex 10, Volume I]

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# Parameters Used to Evaluate Aviation Performance

Accuracy: characterize typical behavior of the system in the presence of nominal errors

Integrity: limit risk from abnormal behavior affecting the system

- Integrity risk
- > Maximum tolerable error
- > Time to alert (TTA)

Continuity: limit risk of losing the service unexpectedly

Availability: fraction of time that one has the accuracy, integrity, and continuity required to perform the desired operation



# 200' Decision Height (DH) Requirements

> Accuracy: < 4 m 95% horizontal & vertical positioning error

#### > Integrity:

- Less than 10<sup>-7</sup> probability of true error larger than 40 m horizontally or 35 m vertically
- > 6 second time-to-alert
- Continuity: < 10<sup>-5</sup> chance of aborting a procedure once it is initiated



> Availability: > 99% of time

# Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS)





# Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS)



# Ionospheric Related Threats to Augmentation Systems

- Poor quality and/or erroneous measurements lead to inaccurate ionospheric corrections
  - > Measurement uncertainty must be accurately described and accounted for
  - > Faulty measurements must be contained
- Ionospheric delay at the user location is different than the ionospheric delay measured by the system
  - > Spatial variation of the ionosphere must be fully modelled
- Ionospheric delay changes from when the correction was generated
  - > Temporal variation of the ionosphere must be well characterized
- Nominal vs. Disturbed
  - Ionosphere is often well behaved and accurately modelled locally
  - Disturbances can lead to very different phenomena that are very difficult to accurately model



#### **Ionospheric Delay**



**IRI** Modeled Ionospheric Delay



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# 11 Year Solar Cycle







# **GBAS:** Gradient Threat





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#### Nominal Day Spatial Gradients Between WAAS Stations



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Slide Courtesy Seebany Datta-Barua

- Alexandre

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#### **GBAS** Threat Model



# **Characteristics of Plasma Bubble**

- Multiple plasma bubbles often occur with separation of about several hundred kilometers [Saito et al., 2009].
- > Drift eastward typically with a velocity of 50-150 m/s [Saito et al., 2009].



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### Worst Track



- October 29, 2003
  - During a severe ionospheric storm
- Observed from
  Washington DC to
  PRN 11



#### **Error Growth**





# **Disturbance in Polar Region**



# Small-scale Irregularity







# **Ionospheric Delay Threats Summary**

#### Spatial gradients nominally below 4 mm/km

- > Extreme values up to ~400 mm/km in disturbed mid-latitude conditions
- Extreme values greater than 500 mm/km observed in equatorial regions

#### Temporal gradients nominally below 1 mm/sec

 Temporal gradients up to 175 mm/sec in disturbed mid-latitude conditions

#### Localized variations observed after storm events

- > ~10 m vertical delay difference over ~ 200 km
- > Otherwise surrounded by smooth ionosphere



# SBAS: Undersampled Threat





# **Estimation of Ionospheric Gradients**

Station Pair Method



- Long baselines
- Free from satellite IFB calibration error



• Long and short

• IFB calibration

error on both SV

baselines

and RR

 $T_1$   $T_2$   $S_1$ 

Time Step

Method

- Short baselines
- Free from IFB
  calibration error
- Corrupted by iono.
  temporal gradients

Slide Courtesy Jiyun Lee



# **Thin Shell Model**

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# **Spatial Decorrelation Estimation**

- Every IPP Is Compared to All Others
- The Great Circle Distance Between the IPPs Is Calculated
- The Difference in Vertical Ionosphere Is Calculated
- A Two-dimensional Histogram Is Formed: Each Bin Corresponds to a Distance Range and a Vertical Difference Range
- Histogram Contains the Counts for Each Time an IPP Pair Fell in a Particular Bin





### Ionospheric Decorrelation (0<sup>th</sup> Order)





### Ionospheric Decorrelation Function (0<sup>th</sup> Order)





#### Ionospheric Decorrelation About a Planar Fit (1<sup>st</sup> Order)





### Ionospheric Decorrelation Function (1<sup>st</sup> Order)

Vertical lonosphere Containment  $\sigma$ , 1<sup>st</sup> Order Correlation (CONUS, 2<sup>nd</sup> July 2000





#### **Disturbed Ionosphere**











#### Equatorial Sigma Estimate 1<sup>st</sup> Order (Sliced by Time)





#### Equatorial Sigma Estimate 1<sup>st</sup> Order (Sliced by Time)

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# SBAS Ionospheric Grid















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### **Undersampled Ionospheric Threat Condition**





Courtesy: Seebany Datta-Barua

#### WAAS Measurements





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# January 11, 2000





# July 16, 2000



07/16/00, 03:33:32 UT, Relative Centroid = 0.075, Fit Radius = 1300, sig  $_{\rm US}$  = 1.4129





# April 6, 2000





# April 6, 2000



04/06/00, 23:15:12 UT, Relative Centroid = 0.175, Fit Radius = 2100, sig  $_{\rm US}$  = 2.2128





#### March 31, 2001







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Iono Model Courtesy: Gary Bust & Seebany Datta-Barua



Iono Model Courtesy: Gary Bust & Seebany Datta-Barua





## October 24-25, 2011



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Iono Model

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Seebany Datta-Barua



#### October 24-25, 2011

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**Courtesy:** Gary Bust &

Seebany Datta-Barua



IDA4D 3° grid Vertically Integrated Ne, 24 Oct 2011, 0400 UT



Iono Model Courtesy: Gary Bust & Seebany Datta-Barua





IDA4D 3° grid Vertically Integrated Ne, 24 Oct 2011, 0600 UT



Iono Model Courtesy: Gary Bust & Seebany Datta-Barua



# **GIVE Elements**

#### Formal error term

- Measurement noise
- Ionospheric modeling error
  - Accounts for sampled ionosphere and disturbance state
- Antenna bias contribution

#### Undersampled threat term

- Spatial & temporal threats
- Floor term
- Storm detector
  - > Local at the IGP
  - Moderate storm detector (MSD)
  - Global extreme storm detector (ESD)



#### Linear estimator

> We choose a linear estimator:



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# **Unbiased estimator**

> The measurements can be decomposed:



> Assuming this form, an unbiased estimator is such that:

$$G^{T} \lambda = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ x_{east} \\ x_{north} \end{bmatrix} \qquad G = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & x_{east,1} & x_{north,1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & x_{east,n} & x_{north,n} \end{bmatrix}$$



### **Confidence Computation**





Sparks, L., Blanch, J., Pandya, N., "Kriging as a Means of Improving WAAS Availability," *Proceedings of the 23rd International Technical Meeting of The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS 2010)*, Portland, OR, September 2010, pp. 2013-2020.

# Kriging variance



# March 16, 2015



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# March 17, 2015



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# **GBAS** Mitigation of Threats

- Ground receivers monitor and correct errors that originate on the satellites or in the atmosphere
  - > Single correction and bound for each satellite
  - Monitoring accuracy limited by the effects multipath, noise, and reference station antenna bias
  - > Confidence bounds limited by ionosphere gradients and and orbital errors
- Airborne receiver must limit the effects of local multipath, noise, and user antenna bias
  - May supplement monitoring by performing checks for local ionospheric and/or tropospheric variations
- Capable of achieving the smallest time-to-alert, the best accuracy, and the smallest integrity bounds



# **SBAS** Mitigation of Threats

- Ground receivers monitor and correct errors that originate on the satellites and in the ionosphere
  - > Satellite clock and ephemeris errors separately corrected
  - > A grid of ionospheric of corrections is provided
  - > Confidence bounds sent for each satellite and each grid point
  - Monitoring accuracy limited by the effects multipath, noise, and reference station antenna bias
  - > Confidence bounds mainly limited by ionospheric disturbances
- Airborne receiver must limit the effects of local multipath, noise, and user antenna bias
- Capable of covering continental regions and thousands of aircraft approach procedures



# Conclusions

The Global Positioning System (GPS), and all other core constellations, require augmentation in order to meet the strict requirements for the guidance of aircraft

GPS L1 signals widely in use for aircraft navigation

#### The ionosphere is one of the most challenging error sources

- Disturbances are difficult to predict and dramatically increase the magnitude of the ranging errors
- Require extensive data sets to examine full range of possible behavior
- > Methods exist to achieve safe vertical guidance of aircraft

