





Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics -The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences

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Policy Instruments 2 Some Applications

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First Teaching Workshop for Middle East + N Africa ICTP Dec 2005 Policy Instruments 2 Some Applications

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Global mean temperature 1860 - 2000



Thanks to Christian Azar and Martin Persson for slides

Historical variation of atmospheric CO₂concentration



Look carefully: you won't find time scales like this in economics...









Market mechanism



Growth and Environment !

- Can we increase income 50% & reduce fossil emissions 50%?
- Transport sector:
- Fuel demand $Q = Y^a P^b$
- Elast: Income: 1, Price -0.8

Gasoline: Price & Use/cap





Increase income 50%
Reduce emissions 50%
Transport: Q = Y P^{-0.8}

economist solution • Raise fuelprice 300% ! • Because • $P = (0.5/1.5)^{-1/0.8} = 3.95$

300%!

Realistic??
Welfare?
Isn't there some other way?
Is it possible?

Yes • Europe has done it! • If all countries had european fuel prices a large part of the problem would be solved • + Industry, heating & elect...

Fuel taxes potent instruments for Climate policy

- With UK prices OECD -40%
- With **US** prices +40%
- Gas tax more important than Kyoto
- why not tax more?
- harder to raise US tax than UK?
- Political lobbies decide

Effect of higher fuel price

Country	Price	Fuel use	fuel use	Reduction in %
AUSTRAL	0,54	13306	7664	42
CANADA	0,51	28167	15535	45
FRANCE	0,95	14216	12968	9
GERM	0,85	30025	25061	17
ITALY	1,12	17565	18230	-4
JAPAN	0,61	41828	26742	36
MEXICO	0,69	21343	15025	30
NETHERL	1,07	4139	4147	0
SPAIN	0,92	8928	7919	11
UK	1,07	21513	21504	0
USA	0,31	356981	131819	63
OECD	0,53	605873	346844	44

Climate change Soloutions

• WHAT CAN WE DO?

• Many *different* things





Houses with no heating



Houses without Heating Systems 20 low energy terrace houses in Göteborg





Fuel use in Swedish district heating



WHY?



Some more Topics

- CONGESTION in transport
- -- and in fishing
- TCE Prohibition, tax or BAT
- REP/NOX
- Political-psychological aspects

The Economics of Congestion

- Assume marginal cost for each vehicle increases with vehicle flow c(V)
- Total cost for traffic V
 C(V) = V*c(V) + e(V)
- Average private cost for V vehicles = V*c(V)/V = c(V)

Marginal social cost =
C' = c(V) + Vc' + e'

NB that both c' and e' increase strongly with increasing flow V

The Economics of Congestion



Congestion and Pollution



Sterner Environmental Policy Making

The DISTRIBUTION of costs and benefits

- Benefit to society of regulation is avoided welfare loss *hem* but note DISTRIBUTION
- **BENEFITS**:
- Victims of Pollution gain *fkmh*
- State gains Tax revenue *abhg*

- COSTS
- Motorists who continue driving gain time but pay tax *abdc-abhg* =
- Loss of -cdhg
- Motorists who stop driving lose CS –*beh*

Special Environmental Considerations

•Emissions depend very strongly on technology!

Vintage	VOC	Nox	Pm
1988	2,5	1,53	37
2000	0,46	0,17	7
2010	0,08	0,04	1,2

And other factors like temperature, population density

Temp	CO 1st Km	Warm engine	VOC 1st km	Warm engine
22	21	0,12	2,6	0,02
-7	123	0,8	15,7	0,25

All figures g/km

Estimates of environmental costs

- 1988 car:
- 12 €/1000 km in the country-side but over 130€ in city centre
- 2010 car had figures of 0,3 and 4 respectively.

- Car turnover important
- Get worst cars out of city centres
- Differentiated envir. Congestion pricing
- I&M
- Cut smog reporting
- Parking?? and others

Transport management (local)

- Singapore Advanced Road Pricing
- Curitiba dedicated express buss lanes
- Banning of vehicles (Vikhram Tempo)
- Cleaner fuel: Phase-out of lead
- Green busses & taxis
- Dia sin Auto
- Roadside monitoring

London

Boundary of the central zone



Transport in MegaCities



Fisheries

- Rather like congestion
- Fishermen would all be better off if effort brought down.
- However a tax that collects all the rent will actually make the fishermen worse off
- Fishery policy badly needed but typical policies are exact opposite of required!

A Bio-economic model of fishing



Over-fishing on Zanzibar



Fishy Policies



- Last natural frontier
- Severe over fishing due to open access
- POLICY NEEDED
- Actual policies opposite to ideal
- ITQs
- Zoning, CPRs

COD



- Cod in Atlantic Banks outside Canada richest in the World
- Crashed 1992
- 30 000 fishermen unemployed
- No sign of recovery after 10 years!

Iceland shows the way



- World Cod catch down 75% since 1968
- 200 mile EFZ hopeful
- Private transferable quotas as SHAREs in TAC
- TAC decided by biologists

Sweden



- Lost North Sea
- Fleet not scraped nor sold to Denmark. Fishes in Baltic
- Coastal cod extinct
- North sea cod severly overfished
- EU sets agenda

CPR or Tragedy of open access

- Property rights are crucial for management
- When yields are low/erratic \rightarrow CPR
- Can work well for irrigation, pasture, fish
- Clear boundaries; Exclusion; Democracy; Peer monitoring; 'Courts'; Graduated fines
- New forms: CAMPFIRE, NPSP farming or informal sector → AIE
- Eco tourism, park fees. Pay for eco-services

Industrial Pollution

- The Classical Domain of Environmental Economics
- Also relevant in many poor, industrialising countries
- Often starts with information and regulation
- Then moves to MBI, taxes/permits & Liability
- Prohibition not necessarily best!

Phase out of Trichloroethylene

- (C₂HCl₃) Degreaser. Good Fat solvent...
- Big Working Environment hazard
- Phase out of CFCs lead to increased use
- Forbidden in Sweden since 1991
- Very heavily regulated in for example Germany. Very strict regulation

Phase out of Trichloroethylene



- MC of abatement very flat
- Most firms substitute
- Some firms find it impossible & litigate
- Why not use P instrument
- Norway did!

Phase out of Trichloroethylene



Swedish Nox Policy

- Very high tax required but not politically feasible.
- Refunded emission Payment used instead
- Has led to rapid reduction (40%) in Nox emissions which are now very much lower than in other countries

REP

- Each company maximizes profit
- $Pq_i c_i(q_i, a_i) Te_i(q_i, a_i) + q_i/(\sum_i q_i)T[\sum_i e_i(q_i, a_i)]$
- *q* is output, *c* is production costs, *a* is abatement, and Te_i is the charge $q_i/(\sum_i q_i)T[\sum_i e_i(q_i, a_i)]$ the refund. FOC are
- $P = c'_{q} + Te'_{q}(1 \sigma_{i}) T(E/Q)(1 \sigma_{i})$

•
$$c'_a = -Te'_a (1 - \sigma_i)$$

PROPERTIES OF REP

- Somewhat similar to tax on excess pollution
- Or tax-subsidy (tax above ê, subsidy below)
- Or to fees that go to earmarked funds
- Very useful when output effect **not** wanted
- Small open economy (competitivity issues)
- Targetting of only some industries
- Compact lobby of powerful polluters

Political aspects

- Lobbying, Monopoly and market power
- The importance of PROCESS
- "Que tout vieil impôt est bon
- Swedish Local Investment Funds
- Psychology of incentives crowding out moral
- Monitoring and the Harrington Paradox
- Corruption & Informal sector
- Building institutions such as EPA
- International Aspects: Transboundary, Trade,