



1st Teaching Workshop on Environmental Economics

for the Middle East and North Africa

December 5-16, 2005 - ICTP, Trieste, Italy

Climate Change, Climate-Change Economics and Policy

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Climate Change, Climate-Change Economics and Policy

the
abdus salam
international centre
for theoretical physics



united nations
educational, scientific
and cultural
organization



international atomic
energy agency



Fondazione
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The Beijing International Institute
of Ecological Economics -
The Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences

Francesco Bosello

***MENANEE Teaching Workshop
ICTP – Trieste –
December 2005***



Structure of the lecture

- 1. Climate change**
- 2. Climate-change impact assessment**
- 3. Climate-change policies**
 - 3.1. Mitigation**
 - 3.2. Adaptation**



Climate Change



Global Warming & Climate Change



Often used as synonyms



**Refer to the *likely* increase in the
global mean temperature of the Earth**



Greenhouse Effect




ONE of the causes of ***Climate Change***



- The atmosphere *and* the Sun heat the Earth's surface.
- The Earth radiates this energy back into space.
- The atmosphere, absorbing some of the outgoing energy, retains heat.

Greenhouse effect and Earth annual and global mean energy balance




Source: IPCC 2001 Climate Change 2001 "The Scientific Basis"



Some Preliminary Definitions

GAS	Origin	Atm. lifetime	GWP
CO₂	<i>Natural + m-made Use of Fossil fuels + deforestation</i>	5-200	1
CH₄	<i>Natural + m-made Livestock + Wetland cultivation (rice)</i>	12	23
N₂O	<i>Natural + m-made Coal burning + Fertilisers</i>	114	296
CFC	<i>M-made Refrigerants + foam plastic, elect. comp.</i>	45	1320 - 9300
HFC	<i>M-made</i>	0.3 - 260	12 - 12000
Fluor.ed	<i>M-made</i>	3200 - 50000	5700 - 22200

Relative “warming” contribution of different GHGs (%)



Source: US Dept. of Energy 2000

Keep in mind: *Water vapour - 95% of all GHGs in the atmosphere - is not in the picture!!*

Studying Climate-Change: A Brief Historical Overview



1986 - “Detection” of the CC phenomenon (Arrhenius)

1955-65 - First modelling efforts (first satellite data). 1967 “first” GCM Manabe & Wetherald.

1988 - IPCC created by WMO and UNEP

1990 - First IPCC report: anthropogenic influence + possible negative impacts.

1990 - Beginning of climate negotiations

1992 - UNFCCC – 240 signatories. Limit CO₂ emissions to 1990 levels by year 2000 + Agenda 21

1995 - Second IPCC report: social-economic dimension of CC:

1997 - Kyoto Protocol

2001 - Third IPCC report: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability.

2004 - Kyoto Protocol into force.



Is global mean temperature really increasing?




How much of the change in temperature is due to the Greenhouse Effect (i.e. to GHGs)?



How much of the change in temperature is due to human influence?

- Note:**
- ***Data are often the same but interpreted differently.***
 - ***Knowledge is continuously increasing.***
 - ***Still large uncertainties.***


A look into the recent past



Surface temperature: warming $\approx 0.1^{\circ}\text{C}$ per decade

Lower troposphere temperature: no warming 1979 -1997

A bit further into the past




Source: IPCC 2001, Climate Change 2001, "The Scientific Basis"

It is likely that the rate and duration of the warming of the 20th century is larger than any other time during the last 1,000 years with 1990s warmest decade of the millennium in the Northern Hemisphere, and 1998 the warmest year (IPCC, 2001).



A look into the “far” past



Source: IPCC

Earth climate has never been steady

There may have been “recent” hotter phases than today

There have been larger and more rapid variations than those predicted by climate models for 2100



Is global mean temperature increasing ?

Key Messages # 1

We are living in a “warming phase”

Likely of unprecedented amplitude

Likely of unprecedented duration

BUT

**We are “conveniently” considering
the past 1000 years horizon**

There are still large uncertainties



How much of the change in temperature is due to the Greenhouse Effect (i.e. to GHGs)?

Any factor that alters the radiation received from the Sun or lost to space or the redistribution of energy between atmosphere, land and ocean can affect climate.



The influence of GHGs on Earth climate is **undisputed.**



That they contribute to determine climatic changes over the time scale of centuries is also **undisputed.**



How much of the change in temperature is due to the Greenhouse Effect (i.e. to GHGs)?

For the sake of completeness...

Ice ages of the last million years linked to changes in absorbed solar radiation affected by orbit changes.

Even longer-term climate changes linked to tectonic events.

Shorter-term climate changes (decadal cycles) linked to atmosphere/ocean interactions and changes in ocean circulation.



How much of the change in temperature is due to the Greenhouse Effect (i.e. to GHGs)?

What is being discussed is the effective contribution of GHG to Climate Change

According to the IPCC

(IPCC, Climate Change 2001, “The Scientific Basis”)



*“In the light of new evidence and taking into account the remaining uncertainties, **most of** [(>50%, 70%?)] the observed warming over the last 50 years is **likely** to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations”.*

According to others

(e.g. Singer, 1999)






“Yet the causal connection [between GHG and climate] is not at all clear.”



How much of the change in temperature is due to the Greenhouse Effect (i.e. to GHGs)?

An example of the controversy and (my personal understanding) of the different positions.

How much of the change in temperature is due to the Greenhouse Effect (i.e. to GHGs)?



Source: IPCC, Climate Change 2001, "The Scientific Basis"



How much of the change in temperature is due to the Greenhouse Effect (i.e. to GHGs)?

Key Messages # 2

GHGs do influence Earth climate

The relevant time scale is centuries

This influence *could be* negligible (sceptics), but also very important (IPCC)



How much of the change in temperature is due to the anthropogenic Influence?

IF GHGs determine **MOST OF Earth climate**



Human contribution to CC is *roughly* represented by human contribution to GHG concentration



How much of the change in temperature is due to the anthropogenic Influence?

GHG concentration from pre-industrial period to present (PpB converted in CO2 eq. via GWP)

	<i>Multiplier (GWP)</i>	<i>Pre-industrial</i>	<i>Natural additions</i>	<i>M-made additions</i>	<i>Tot. Relative Contr.n</i>	<i>Percent of Total</i>
CO2	1	288,000	68,520	11,880	368,400	72.369
CH4	21	17,808	12,117	6,720	36,645	7.199
N2O	310	88,350	3,599	4,771	96,720	19.000
CFCs and oth.	many	2,500	0	4,791	7,291	1.432
Total		396,658	84,236	28,162	509,056	100.000

Source: adapted from U.S. Department of Energy, 2000



Human Contribution

$$= \frac{28,162}{509,056} * 100 = 5.5322 \%$$



How much of the change in temperature is due to the anthropogenic Influence?

Considering that m-made emissions are concentrated in this century the IPCC concludes:



***“Anthropogenic GHGs are likely to have made a **significant and substantial** contribution to the warming observed during the **second half of the 20th century**” (IPCC: CC 2001
“The scientific basis)***



How much of the change in temperature is due to the anthropogenic influence?

BUT !

*GHG concentration from pre-industrial period to present
(PpB converted in CO2 eq. via GWP) considering **Water Vapour***

	<i>% of All Greenhouse Gases</i>	<i>% Natural</i>	<i>% Man-made</i>
Water vapor	95.000%	94.999%	0.001%
CO2	3.618%	3.502%	0.117%
CH4	0.360%	0.294%	0.066%
N2O	0.950%	0.903%	0.047%
CFC's, and others	0.072%	0.025%	0.047%
Total	100.00%	99.72	0.28%



How much of the change in temperature is due to the anthropogenic influence?

Key Messages # 3

Over the last century human contribution to climate change ranged from the 0.28% (with WV) to the 5.53% (w/o WV)



Climate Models

Temperature Increase

Climate Forcing
.....
GHG Emissions


Human Influence

Scenarios of social-economic development

Alternative images of how the future might unfold. Tools with which to analyze how driving forces may influence future emission outcomes and to assess the associated uncertainties.



SRES Scenarios



A1: rapid economic growth and technological dev.p.m. Low population growth.

A2: heterogeneous world, preservation of local id, economic growth but more fragmented technological progr. High population growth.

B1: convergent world, low population growth, development towards a high tech and service society. Emphasis on sustainability.



B2: like B1, but with more emphasis on local solution.

Source: IPCC, Climate Change 2001, "The Scientific Basis"




Anthropogenic emissions of major GHGs

Source:
IPCC,
Climate
Change
2001, "The
Scientific
Basis"



Temperature Increase

Source:
IPCC,
Climate
Change
2001, "The
Scientific
Basis"





How much of the change in temperature is due to the anthropogenic Influence?

Key Messages # 4

According to all IPCC scenarios anthropogenic influence is a main determinant of **FUTURE climate change**

Uncertainty remains !!!!!



Let's Start With Economics



Is CC a problem?

Yes if even though independently upon human contribution some negative consequences may arise

Is this an economic problem?

Yes if we may want to intervene to alleviating adverse consequences given scarce resources

Cost and benefit of ADAPTATION strategies

In addition in the presence of a human contribution

We may want to intervene to reduce CC causes given scarce resources

Cost and benefit of MITIGATION strategies

Harmoniz. MITIGATION ADAPTATION



This originated two strands of “research” families

“Climate-change impact assessment”

Climate-change costs are representative of climate-change policy benefits in term of avoided damage

“Climate-change policy assessment”


*Costs of climate change policies to be compared with benefits, but also in **the presence of sub-optimal targets** in term of effectiveness, efficiency, equity => sustainability*



Climate-Change Impact Assessment




Exemplifying a climate-change impact (Integrated) assessment exercise





What has to be evaluated: a tentative classification of C-C impacts

- ✓ Water resources
- ✓ Agricultural and food security
- ✓ Terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems
- ✓ Coastal zones and marine ecosystems
- ✓ Human settlements
- ✓ Energy and industry
- ✓ Insurance and other financial services
- ✓ Human health





Peculiarities of C-C Impact Assessment ***#1***

- ✓ **UNCERTAINTY:** *the knowledge of environmental and socio-economic dynamics, and of the feedback between the two is still affected by a large amount of uncertainty.*
- ✓ **GEOGRAPHICAL SCALE:** *climate change is a global phenomenon affecting the whole world, at the same time environmental and socio-economic impulses and responses are highly differentiated across regions.*
- ✓ **TIME SCALE:** *climate change is a long-term phenomenon. Assessing impacts on environmental and socio-economic systems requires a long-run perspective.*



Peculiarities of C-C Impact Assessment #2

✓ EFFECTS INVOLVING INTERACTING SYSTEMS

characterized by:

- *Non linearity (in environmental and economic systems)*
- *Discontinuity (“Jumps”, abrupt changes of state e.g. extreme events, catastrophes, new technologies),*
- *Irreversibility (non-return point e.g. species extinction, irreversible investments high sunk costs).*

✓ WELFARE MEASUREMENT (ethical judgements):

- *Interpersonal utility comparison (is it possible to compare and aggregate utility?)*
- *Inter-temporal utility comparison (is it legitimate to discount and what discount rate has to be used?)*
- *Choice of a metric (NON market values - money, loss of human life, multi-criteria approach?)*




Summarizing: a cascade of uncertainty!

***Uncertainty on
climate change***

***Uncertainty on its
“physical” impacts***

***Uncertainty on
social-economic
evaluation***





**Let's try anyway the
exercise!**



Damages in physical units: 2.5° C temperature increase scenario


Type of Damage	INDICATOR	Non						World
		EU	USA	FSU	CHINA	OECD	OECD	
Agriculture	<i>Welfare loss (%GDP)</i>	0,21	0,16	0,24	2,1	0,28	0,17	0,23
Forestry	<i>Area lost (Km2)</i>	52	282	908	121	334	901	1235
Fishery	<i>Reduced Catch (1000 t)</i>	558	452	814	464	4326	2503	6829
Energy	<i>Incr. El. Dem. (TWh)</i>	54,2	92	54,6	17,1	142,7	211,2	353,9
Water	<i>Reduced Avail. (Km3)</i>	15,3	32,7	24,7	32,2	168,5	62,2	230,7
Coastal Prot.	<i>Annual Cost (m\$/yr)</i>	133	176	51	24	514	493	1007
Dryland loss	<i>Area lost (Km2)</i>	1,6	10,7	23,9	0	99,5	40,4	139,9
Wetland loss	<i>Area lost (Km2)</i>	9,9	11,1	9,8	11,9	219,1	33,9	253
Ecosystem loss	<i>Nr. of Habitats Lost</i>	16	8	n.a.	4	53	53	106
Health	<i>Nr. of Deaths (1000)</i>	8,8	6,6	7,7	29,4	114,8	22,9	137,7
Migration	<i>Nr. Of Migrants (1000)</i>	229	100	153	583	2279	455	2734
Hurricanes								
<i>Casualties</i>	<i>Nr. of Deaths (1000)</i>	0	72	44	779	7687	313	8000
<i>Damages</i>	<i>m\$</i>	0	115	1	13	124	506	630



But consider for instance

Climate Change Mortality 2050 by Region and Disease (additional deaths)

	Malaria	Schisto	Dengue	Cardio-Vascular	Respiratory	Diarrhea	Total
USA	0	0	0	-174158	2540	2006	-169613
EU	0	0	0	-178895	2389	590	-175916
EEFSU	0	0	0	-289210	3970	1074	-284166
JPN	0	0	0	-68009	3784	15	-64211
RoA1	0	0	0	-47070	1267	31	-45772
Eex	753	-62	53	-50088	82341	31244	64241
CHIND	632	0	626	-813307	92732	28709	-690608
RoW	63090	-568	535	-143466	175516	421683	516791
WORLD	64475	-630	1215	-1764202	364538	485352	-849252





Key Messages # 5

Climate Change impacts are highly differentiated at the geographical scale


There can be also positive consequences

Even though sticking to the “hard” physical facts, climate change is a matter of scale but also of redistribution



Costing Methodologies

Degree of “comprehensiveness” of the economic picture



Role of time and accuracy of its description



The “direct cost” methodology

$$(\text{Total Cost}) = (\text{Price}) \times (\text{Quantity})$$

e.g.:

Health Cost of CC = (Number of deaths) x (value of life)

Cost of Sea-Level rise = (Land lost) x (value of land)

etc.

Purely static exercise: either because it refers to points in time or because it does not consider adaptation of the social-economic system



Example

Monetized Damage: 2.5° C temperature increase scenario

Region	Fankhauser (1995)		Tol (1995)	
	<i>bn\$</i>	<i>% GDP</i>	<i>bn\$</i>	<i>% GDP</i>
<i>EU</i>	63.6	1.4		
<i>USA</i>	61.0	1.3		
<i>Other OECD</i>	55.9	1.4		
<i>OECD Americas</i>			74.2	1.5
<i>OECD Europe</i>			56.5	1.3
<i>OECD Pacific</i>			59.0	2.8
Total OECD	180.5	1.3	189.5	1.6
<i>E.Europe/FSU</i>	18.2	0.7	-7.9	-0.3
<i>Centrally Planned Asia</i>	16.7	4.7	18.0	5.2
<i>South & South-East Asia</i>			53.5	8.6
<i>Africa</i>			30.3	8.7
<i>Latin America</i>			31.0	4.3
<i>Middle East</i>			1.3	4.1
Total Non-OECD	89.1	1.6	126.2	2.7

Source: Adapted from IPCC 1996 SAR



A step further: the “G-E, Systemic” Approach

- ✓ The world is divided into economic areas (regions, countries).
- ✓ Each area is divided into economic sectors.
- ✓ All these “cells” *communicate* through economic (and environmental) mechanisms.



The main economic linkages and propagation mechanisms can be highlighted (domestic and international substitution between factors and goods). **Direct and indirect** consequences are taken into account.

Examples



C-C Impact Assessment

Health

C-C Impact on GDP: direct vs G-E effects (2050)

Sea-level rise

Source: Bosello et al. 2004, 2005





Impact interactions

C-C impacts on GDP:


- health
- sea-level
- tourism
- agriculture



Summing GE effects



Compounding GE effects



■ SUM of GE Effects ■ GE effects



A “Dynamic” Approach

It has to be considered that climate and economic systems **interact dynamically over time** and that **damages are a continuous flow over time** associated to each ton of greenhouse gas emitted.


Only a rough indication can be provided by point estimates like damages stemming from 2.5°C of temperature increase.

	1991-2000	2001-2010	2011-2020	2021-2030
Nordhaus (1994)	5.3	6.8	8.6	10
Cline (1992,1993)	5.8-124	7.6-154	9.8-186	11.8-221
Peck and Teisberg (1992)	10-12	12-14	14-18	18-22
Fankhauser (1994)	20.3	22.8	25.3	27.8
Maddison (1994)	5.9-6.1	8.1-8.4	11.1-11.5	14.7-15.2

Source: as in table


C-C Impact Assessment

Climate change damages as % of GDP



Source: our computation running the FEEM-RICE model

Discounted Climate change damages as % of discounted GDP 1990-2100



Source: our computation running the FEEM-RICE model



Key Messages # 6

Climate Change impacts are highly differentiated at the geographical scale

Considering large aggregations they are far from catastrophic, but they increase as the detail increases

There is an unambiguous penalization of developing countries

Note the role of time dimension



Climate-Change Policies



In the previous steps we “determined” climate-change **costs**

Amounting to determining **benefits** of climate-change policies

then

If we determine climate-change policy **costs** + **effectiveness**

And compare


We can determine the optimal balance between benefits and costs of climate change policies

i.e.

We can find the optimal (utility maximising) level intervention.



Graphically: optimal internalization of the externality



≈ 0.6% to 2% of GDP



Mitigation (abatement)



Framing the problem

(IF there is anthropogenic influence on climate change)

Emissions originate/are an externality

Negative CC consequences imposed to others different from polluters, benefits appropriated by polluters only

These negative consequences are non priced (external to the market)

Overprovision of the “bad”, too much CC respect to social optimum

Negative externality is a “public bad”, its reduction is a public good

Non rivalry

Non excludability

Free riding + “leakage”



Now, back to mitigation costs: What are they?

Direct costs of mitigation activities



These are “good” costs to internalise the externality

Competitiveness costs for sectors and countries




If decision to mitigate concerns some actors only

Social costs: who and in which form bears the costs.




Lower growth → higher unemployment (?); higher prices to final consumers

Source: our computation running the Peck-Teisberg model (1992)



Optimal abatement (mitigation) considering direct costs and benefits of policies



Source: our computation running the FEEM-RICE model



Which in our case amounts to spending in the entire period 1990-2100 roughly the:

0.03% of world GDP

To reduce environmental damage roughly of the:

7%

Giving a gain in terms of avoided damage roughly of the:

0.04% of world GDP



What can influence these outcomes and thus climate change mitigation policies?

Higher damages and catastrophic irreversible events

The role of uncertainty

The perception of time

The role of ancillary benefits

Higher damages and catastrophic irreversible events

It is trivial to demonstrate that in the presence of higher environmental damages all models suggest higher abatement

(Indeed I am not showing this just believe me)!

But this simple and intuitive result depends on the absence of uncertainty

In other words: we would be willing to abate more if we were sure that damages were higher



But

true damages are uncertain

One can claim that uncertainty should induce higher conservation anyway


Unfortunately uncertainty works in many directions

Damages(costs) can be higher (lower), but also lower (higher) than expected

We can incur in losses being too risky, but also too cautious (irreversibility)

Different “uncertainty areas” can compensate each other e.g. higher damage by a lower climate sensitivity

Playing with uncertainty



- **Base emission path**
- **Emission path consistent with a low environmental damage**
- **Emission path consistent with a high environmental damage**
- **Possible emission paths consistent with uncertainty**
- - - - -
- . . . -



The perception of time

As said: deciding about a policy is a matter of balancing costs and benefits *inter-temporally*



**Climate-change damages, and thus possible benefits of mitigation policies, are experienced in the (far) future.
Costs are sustained in the present**



Our perception of future and our balance between present and future determine our decisions today



Given That

Benefits of abatement are a stream increasing over time according to the slope of the damage function...


...the longer-term the perspective, the higher the benefits from a possible mitigation strategy.

Moreover


The higher the “weight” of the future, (an economist would say the less we discount the future), the higher the incentive to mitigate.

C-C Policies

The “perspective”



*The role of time:
welfare gains of a
mitigation policy
wrt no policy*



Discounting

Source: our computation running
the FEEM-RICE model



The role of ancillary benefits

Ancillary effects: incidental side effects of policies aimed exclusively at greenhouse gas mitigation

Ancillary benefits:

Health effects

Ecological effects

Economics effects

Social effects

Ancillary costs



Key Messages # 7

Benefits deriving from abatement can overcome its costs and (strong) mitigation policies can be justified but it is necessary at least:

To adopt a long-run perspective

To consider all benefits (also ancillary)

To behave according to the precautionary principle respect to environmental irreversibility and discontinuity



And remember:

Given the uncertainty of climate-change damages, targets for mitigation policies cannot be defined ***optimally*** (costs perfectly balancing benefits at the margin), but ***“reasonably”*** or ***“prudentially”*** in environmental and economic terms.

e.g.

**Reduce GHG emissions to the 1990 level in year 2000
(1992 Rio “Earth Summit”)**


**Reduce GHG emissions the 5.2% respect to 1990 level
within the period 2008-2012 (Kyoto Protocol)**

Stabilize carbon concentration at 550, 450 ppm.




The “standard” tools in climate-change policies

	Public interv.	Adm. costs	Eff.ness	Eff. cy	Rev. Raising
Command and Control	High	Low	High	Low	None
Emission taxes	Medium	High	Low	High	High
Property/Emission rights	Low	Low - High	High	High	None - High



Blue plant

Red plant





Further issues: *international negotiations* and climate-change mitigation policies

GHGs emissions are a “public bad”

Environmental effectiveness => “large” participation

Free-riding incentive

No super-national enforcing authority exists

Agreement based on “voluntary” participation => Benefits > Costs to participants

Countries are different

Uneven distribution of gains among winners and winners and losers



All this condensates in two key concepts

C-C Policies

An IEA can be *signed* if and only if it is **profitable** to all parties

Each participant is better off with than without the agreement

An IEA can be *sustained over time* if and only if it is **stable** to all parties

- No incentive to free-ride: each participant is better off inside the agreement than outside the agreement with other parties committed to the agreement
- Outsiders no incentive to join in

In principle both issues can be accommodated with transfers from winners to losers or to potential free-riders



According to the theory *this can be very difficult*
indeed

The higher the benefits the, higher the incentive to free ride that cannot be possibly offset by any transfer scheme
(Carraro Siniscalco, 1992; Heal 1994; Barrett, 1997)

EXIT 1



An IEA with binding content can be signed only by a small number of countries (max 3)

EXIT 2



An IEA is signed by a large number of participants => it is empty of environmental commitment



An example: an interpretation of the Kyoto Protocol negotiation process

**USA + Australia
non-ratification**

*The agreement is perceived as excessively costly = **non profitable**.
Requiring “meaningful participation” of LDCs = requiring a **transfer** from LDCs*

Russia ratification

*Required reduction low and possibility to sell hot-air => agreement very **profitable + no incentive to free ride***

EU ratification

Possibility to buy hot air lowers costs + wrong estimates of costs?

**In general,
attempts to
widening the
agreement**

Indirect relaxation of the commitment see carbon sinks => approaching status quo ante



***In addition, regarding negotiations:
the effectiveness/efficiency/equity puzzle***



C-C Policies

Source: UNFCCC, 3rd National Communications

Today

Effectiveness does require a meaningful involvement of developing countries

Tomorrow



Source: IPCC SRES 2001




But also efficiency

The general argument

Blue Country

Red Country



Cost reduction (efficiency gain) is possible when effort is concentrated where it is “cheaper”

Of course a transfer is necessary



Where is it cheaper to abate?

Abatement in Developing Countries is usually cheaper than abatement in Developed Countries



In Developed Countries technological development and taxation systems have already pushed production systems to lower energy and emission intensity




Cheaper abatement options already exploited => additional reductions very costly. Marginal abatement costs higher



But equity?

On the one hand there are the legitimate instances of development of Developing Countries

On the other, also considering the contribution to GHG emissions from a more “balanced” perspective:





What can be done?

Careful design of country commitments (emission reduction targets) in order to reach equitable burden sharing

Surely does not provide cost minimization

Very difficult, but outcome politically feasible

Design an “efficient” agreement and then use transfers to compensate heavily abating countries

Note: efficiency \Rightarrow cost minimization \Rightarrow maximum gain \Rightarrow largest amount to be transferred

“Easier”, but politically unfeasible



In both cases

It can be attempted to enlarge the gain from cooperation



ISSUE LINKAGE



Joint negotiations on multiple agreements



Key Messages # 8

Optimal (cost-effective) abatement seems to be low → This notwithstanding (because of?) uncertainty on costs and benefits. Role of time dimension.

Implementing this albeit low abatement effort is difficult: Costs/gains unevenly distributed among countries; incentive to free-ride; effectiveness/efficiency/equity seem to work in opposite directions.

This is true also for tools: the most effective instruments are also the most costly.

Crucial role of compensating mechanisms.




ADAPTATION



A shift in emphasis in the second half of the '90s

**Until mid '90s
main focus on
mitigation (1995
SAR)**



Prudential and reasonable

"Easy" to investigate




*Standard tools for economic policy
(command and control and/or market based mech.s)
& standard analysis.*

Then

Awareness of climate inertias

***Difficulty of effective
implementation of mitigation
policies (Kyoto)***



***Interest on
adaptation (2001
TAR)***



Adaptation: any adjustment in ecological-social-economic system in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli, impacts or effects (Smit et. al 1999).

Several criteria can be used to identify the different adaptation processes (see e.g. Smit et al. 1999; Klein and Tol, 1997; Fankhauser et al., 1999; IPCC, 2001).

Concept or Attribute	
Purposefulness	<i>Autonomous → Planned</i>
Timing	<i>Anticipatory → Responsive</i>
Temporal Scope	<i>Short term → Long term</i>
Spatial Scope	<i>Localised → Widespread</i>
Function/Effects	<i>Retreat – accommodate – protect – prevent</i>
Form	<i>Structural – legal – institutional</i>
Valuation of performance	<i>Effectiveness-efficiency-equity-feasibility</i>

Source: adapted from Smit et al. 1999



Autonomous Adaptation: natural automatic response to a “shock”. Also socio-economic systems react partly autonomously. There are substitution possibilities triggered by price (scarcity) signals.

Planned Adaptation: strategies apt to alleviating the damage once it is (or will be) materialized via proper modifications of the impacted socio-economic-environmental system. Undertaken by public agencies – agents.



Objectives of planned adaptation (Klein and Tol, 1997):

- ✓ increasing the robustness of infrastructural design and long term investment,
- ✓ increasing the flexibility of vulnerable managed system,
- ✓ enhancing the adaptability of vulnerable natural systems,
- ✓ reversing trends that increase vulnerability (“maladaptation”),
- ✓ improving societal awareness and preparedness.



Apart from definitions and classifications the literature on adaptation is very narrow and incomplete indeed IPCC TAR states:

[p. 779] *“...Adaptation to climate change has the potential to substantively reduce many of the adverse impacts of climate change and enhance beneficial impacts - though neither without cost nor without leaving residual damages...”*
nevertheless [p. 880]: *“...Current knowledge of adaptation and adaptive capacity is **insufficient** for reliable predictions of adaptations; it also is insufficient for rigorous evaluation of planned adaptation options, measures and policies of governments”*



Some tentative quantifications of adaptation costs

	<i>M. US\$ 1997</i>	<i>% of GDP in 2050</i>	<i>Study</i>
Full Coastal Protection	207458	0.29	<i>(a) From Bosello et al. (2004a)</i>
Space Heating and Cooling	23065	0.00048	<i>(b) From Fankhauser (1995)</i>
Resettlement and Migration Costs	4327	0.0022	<i>(c) From Fankhauser (1995)</i>
	13800	0.0072	<i>(d) From Tol (1995)</i>
Health	214949	0.11	<i>(e) From Bosello et al. (2004b)</i>
TOTAL	449789	0.39	<i>(a)+(b)+(c)+(e)</i>
TOTAL	459262	0.4	<i>(a)+(b)+(d)+(e)</i>

Source: adapted from studies in table

Adaptation seems to be able to offset climate change damages at a low cost!



BUT

- ➔ Quantitative evidence on adaptation still needed.
- ➔ More importantly, a framework is still needed, clarifying the different mechanisms through which adaptation and mitigation operate, highlighting respective cost-efficiency and effectiveness.

Some research questions

If we can adapt, is it still worth to mitigate? If yes what are the main drivers of the choices to mitigate and adapt? What would characterise an “optimal” mix between the two strategies?



An Example:

Possible results from a “simple” model where a central planner can decide not only how much to abate (mitigate), but also how much to invest in protection from climate change damages (adapt).

To clarify:

Mitigation = Abatement




Filters end of chimneys

Adaptation = Protection




Building dikes

Abatement Rates (%)



CO2 Emissions



C-C Policies

Abatement is lower



Resources are shared between the two strategies



and




Emissions are higher




but...

C-C Policies




The damage suffered is lower

Difference in Discounted Consumption. Adaptation - No Adaptation (%)



Welfare is higher

Cost Distribution Between Strategies



Mitigation prevails in earlier phases, adaptation in the latter.

Benefit side: benefits from adaptation sooner (economic inertia 10 ys), benefits from mitigation later (environmental inertia 50 ys) => **need to mitigate in advance.**

Environmental side: weaker inertia=> adaptation is a better response to *current* damage => **need to adapt only when damage materializes** (i.e. after 2040).

Cost side: mitigation penalises current output, adaptation penalises present *and* future output (effects on capital stock). Initially damage and capital stocks low => **penalizing capital stock (adapt) less cost effective than penalizing current output (mitigate).** Then the situation reverses => **adapting more cost effective than mitigate.**



XTP	(Discounted) Effectiveness of policies: (% reduction of damage wrt no policy)			(Discounted) Expenditures on policies		
	Total	Mitigation (% on total)	Adaptation (% on total)	Total (% of GDP)	Mitigation US b. \$	Adaptat. US b. \$
2020	-0.42	100	0	0.01	6.54	0
2030	-1.13	100	0	0.01	7.55	0
2040	-8.68	21	79	0.12	8.25	110
2050	-18.76	13	87	0.2	8.72	290
2100	-55	6	94	0.8	9.26	1530


In 2100, 160 times more resources devoted to adaptation, but adaptation only 15 times more damage reducing. Mitigation seems more cost-effective. So why the unbalance?




Policies must be considered in relative and not absolute terms.

Structure of abatement costs: abatement costs exponential. Steeply increasing beyond a 10% abatement rate. (6% abatement costs 9 US billions \$, 50% abatement costs 2112 US billions \$).


Adding the benefit side: a 50% abatement rate costs 2112 bs \$ and reduce the damage the 29%, 1530 billions \$ invested in adaptation reduce the damage the 52%.



Discount Rate: Effect on Abatement Rates





Effect of the discount rate



Lowering discount rates increases both abatement and investment in adaptation

Discount Rate: Effect on Adaptation Stock





But in relative terms mitigation increases more: Lower $dr \Rightarrow$ future “more important” \Rightarrow “environmental inertia” reduced \Rightarrow mitigation relatively more convenient.



Key Messages # 9

Mitigation and adaptation are strategic complements. Both contribute to the solution of the climate change problem.

It is dynamically optimal to mitigate first and adapt then. No “wait and see” mood for mitigation even though adapting is possible.

The possibility of higher future environmental damage or higher preferences for the future increase the weight of mitigation wrt adaptation.

When, in latter phases, adaptation becomes convenient, the large majority of resources are absorbed by adaptation. It is more cost-effective.



THANK YOU!



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