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Workshop Towards Neutrino Technologies

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Antineutrino monitoring at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)

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### Antineutrino Monitoring at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS)

A Joint Project Between Sandia and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories

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Sandia is a multi-program laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000



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#### **Acknowledgements and Project Team**



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#### **Timeline of LLNL/SNL Presence at SONGS**



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#### **Our Past, Present and Future Home**



Our long stay at SONGS is a strong validation of the nonintrusiveness of this technique.

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#### **SONGS Unit 2 Tendon Gallery**

- Tendon gallery is ideal location
  - Rarely accessed for plant operation
  - As close to reactor as you can get while being outside containment
  - Provides ~20 mwe overburden





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# Detected antineutrino rates from reactors are reasonable for cubic meter scale detectors

# Reactors emit huge numbers of antineutrinos

- 6 antineutrinos per fission from beta decay of daughters
- 10<sup>21</sup> fissions per second in a 3,000-MWt reactor



About 10<sup>22</sup> antineutrinos are emitted per second from a typical PWR unattenuated and in all directions

#### Detected rates are quite reasonable

- 10<sup>17</sup> antineutrinos per square meter per second at 25-m standoff
- 6,000 events per ton per day with a perfect detector
- 600 events per ton per day with a simple detector (e.g., SONGS1)

Example: detector total footprint with shielding is 2.5 meter on a side at 25-m standoff from a 3-GWt reactor

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#### **Antineutrino Detection**

We use the same antineutrino detection technique used to first detect (anti)neutrinos:

$$\overline{v_e} + p \rightarrow e^+ + n$$

- inverse beta-decay produces a pair of correlated events in the detector very effective background suppression
- Gd loaded into liquid scintillator captures the resulting neutron after a relatively short time



#### **Neutrino Energy is Sensitive to Isotope**



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#### The Antineutrino Production Rate varies with Time

The fuel of a reactor evolves under irradiation: <sup>235</sup>U is consumed and <sup>239</sup>Pu is produced

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The energy spectrum and integral rate produced by each fissioning isotope is different

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#### **Timeline of LLNL/SNL Presence at SONGS**



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#### Sandia/LLNL Antineutrino Detector (SONGS1)

- 640 liters Gd doped liquid scintillator readout by 8 x 8" PMTs
- 6-sided water shield
- 5-sided active muon veto







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#### **Candidate event extraction**

We record ~30 million events per 100000 day, only a handful of which are antineutrino interactions An automatic energy calibration is  $\overline{v}$  candidates, 28µs performed using background 2.6 MeV gamma Counts Cuts are applied to extract uncorrelated background, 10000 correlated events: 1/singles rate energy cuts >2.5 MeV prompt >3.5 MeV delayed at least 100µs after a muon in the veto detector 1000 Examine time between prompt and 200 400 600 800 0 delayed to pick out neutron captures on Gd Inter-event time ( $\mu$ s)



#### Reactor Power Monitoring using only $\overline{v}$



#### Long Term Monitoring – Fuel composition



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#### SONGS1 was very successful, but....

- ...the liquid scintillator
  - is slightly flammable, combustible
    - Note: newer formulations are much safer (similar to plastics)
  - requires extra precautions to exclude the possibility of any liquid spillage
- With the SONGS1 run completed, we leveraged installed infrastructure to investigate several paths to more deployable detectors:
  - Use of less combustible, more robust, plastic scintillator
  - Use of doped water Cerenkov detectors instead of scintillator

#### In Pursuit of Other Technologies

- Plastic Scintillator
  - Solves hazardous material problem
  - Able to be preassembled and easily transported
  - Difficulty to include neutron capture
  - Include dead material in fiducial volume
- Water Cerenkov
  - Cheap materials
  - No hazardous material issues
  - Insensitive to backgrounds from proton recoil
  - Very low light-yield ⇒ poor efficiency
- Germanium
  - Non-hazardous materials
  - Much higher cross-section ⇒ compact size
  - Cryogenic system
  - Increased need for shielding



#### **Plastic Detector**

- Replace half of liquid scintillator with plastic scintillator (PS):
  - Must retain neutron capture capability, ideally on Gd
    - commercial neutron capture PS not suitable/available (e.g. Boron loaded BC-454)
  - Final design: 2 cm slabs of BC-408 PS, interleaved with mylar sheets coated in Gd loaded paint







#### **Construction of Plastic Detector**





#### **Plastic detector outage data**



Plastic detector shows similar sensitivity as Liquid, when normalized to fiducial mass

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#### A Water based Antineutrino Detector

- Water Cerenkov commonly used for neutrino detection
- Addition of a neutron capture agent should allow for antineutrino detection via inverse beta decay
- Addition of ~0.2% GdCl<sub>3</sub> has been studied at LLNL/UC Davis
  - known to be stable in water
  - Does not affect light attenuation in small detectors





#### **Construction of Water Detector**





# **Initial Data**

#### Aboveground At LLNL

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 The water detector desponds to neutrons in the expected fashion: neutron captures on Gd are observed, as well as correlated (gamma,neutron) and (neutron,neutron) ievents from an <sup>252</sup>Cf neutron source





#### Unshielded Water Detector Results at SONGS

- The water detector was initially deployed without passive shielding
  - High correlated and uncorrelated background rates have made it difficult to clearly identify a reactor signal. Best evidence so far:



- Gd-doped water should be sensitive to reactor antineutrinos but we are yet to prove it.
- Neutron-neutron correlated backgrounds must be reduced
- Data being re-analyzed as a PhD project (Jerry Coleman at LSU)



#### SONGS1 Removal – August 2008 5+ years in U2TG





#### **Timeline of LLNL/SNL Presence at SONGS**



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### New Deployment at SONGS Unit-3 May 2008

- Leveraged our good relationship with SONGS to initiate new deployment in the second reactor tendon gallery
- With University of Chicago we tested a prototype germanium detector
  - ✓Non-hazardous materials
  - ✓ Much higher cross-section ⇒ compact size
  - **X**Cryogenic system
  - **XIncreased need for shielding**
  - Physical process that has never been seen before







#### **Installed at SONGS**





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#### **Germanium: preliminary results of SONGS** deployment



First months of data show:

For the first time the background is of same order as the NCS signal

- Internal backgrounds are now within 2-3x of necessary
- Few weeks of reactor off data were dominated by surface activation
- Possible noise fluctuations have been causing poor low-energy performance
- No evidence of reactor induced backgrounds



#### Interest Developing from Safeguards Agencies

- We are very pleased that as a result of our work, and other projects getting under way elsewhere, IAEA is considering this new tool
- Experts meeting (Vienna 2008)
  - Assessing where it might fit
  - Bulk accountancy mentioned
  - Online refueled mentioned
- Expecting an SP-1 (official IAEA request for further development and study) later this year



# Final Report: Focused Workshop on **Antineutrino Detection** for Safeguards Applications 28-30 October 2008 **IAEA Headquarters, Vienna**



# Conclusion

- Antineutrino detectors can be used to monitor nuclear reactors remotely and non-invasively
  - This has been firmly established by prior experiments and has been demonstrated by our collaboration with a more practical/simple device
- We are pursuing several directions in promising technologies that are more deployable
- Currently involved in looking towards aboveground deployments
  - Improved shielding enclosures
  - Improved water detector design
    - Should be deployed at the end of this year
  - Scintillator detectors with neutron/gamma separation
    - Novel capture agents (Li, B,...)
    - PSD for fast neutron elimination
    - Segmentation

